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1 This paper is the English version of a presentation of the ongoing research project Energie Sisma 
Emilia (http://www.energie.unimore.it) of University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy) which 
aims at analysing the fractures that the earthquake brought about, not only in the physical structure 
of cities, but also in their socio-economic fabric. An Italian version of this contribution is pub-
lished in the book edited by B. Oppi and S. Martello “Relazioni pubbliche e disastri ambientali” 
(forthcoming, BUP, Bologna). The project is coordinated by Margherita Russo and Paolo Silvestri 
and this work is co-authored by many authors. Nevertheless, section on public management is by 
Anna Francesco Pattaro and Marco Ranuzzini, section on manufacturing is by Margherita Russo 
and Manuel Reverberi, section on Agriculture is by Francesco Pagliacci, section on the credit sec-
tor is by Paola Vezzani, Elisabetta Gualandri and Alessia Pedrazzoli. 
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ABSTRACT 
The 2012 earthquake in Emilia-Romagna (Italy) has shaken up the collective understanding on the 
socioeconomic importance of a vast territory that generates almost 2% of Italian GDP. The area af-
fected by the earthquake is characterized by the presence of important industrial and agricultural 
districts, and by good practices of local governance that are internationally renowned. Private and 
public buildings, factories, offices and retail shops, historical and cultural heritage sites have been 
severely damaged. Not only, but it set in motion transformations in the socio-economic system that 
might have unexpected consequences and that undermine the quick recovery of the local system: 
different agents, at different levels, taking individual and collective decisions, generate a cascade 
of changes that interact with its evolution path. Indeed, earthquakes pose challenges, but provide 
unprecedented opportunities: strategic decisions by economic and political agents, newly available 
financial resources, coordination or lack of coordination among main stakeholders, and so on. The 
following paper provides an overview of the first results of Energie Sisma Emilia research project: 
it aims at collecting and disseminating relevant knowledge and evidence in order to design poli-
cies. In particular, it identifies the agents propelling innovation processes, and analyses their strat-
egies in ever-changing environment. The paper starts with a socio-economic analysis of the area 
struck by the earthquake, followed by the results of three of the focus groups conducted. Eventual-
ly, it illustrates a specific innovation: the introduction and implementation of the digital infrastruc-
ture “Mude”. 
Key words: earthquake and its socio-economic effects; innovation and complex systems dynam-
ics 
JEL Codes: O14 – Industrialization, Manufacturing and Services Industries, Choice of Technolo-
gy; O35 – Social Innovation; Q54 – Climate, Natural Disaster and Their Management, Global 
Warming;  
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Introduction 
What development paths are taken in areas affected by natural disasters? 
Natural disasters like the ones which occurred in Italy after the Second World 
War, particularly earthquakes, flooding and landslides, have attracted increasing 
attention, not only from scholars, to the fragility of both urban and rural areas and 
the need for prevention programmes to mitigate the economic and social effects of 
natural disasters.  
In economic literature (for example Albala-Bertrand, 1993a; 1993b; Tol and 
Leek, 1999; Okuyama and Chang, 2004; Benson and Clay, 2004; Strömberg, 
2007; UNISDR, 2009; Cuaresma, 2009; Cavallo and Noy, 2009; Cavallo et al., 
2010; The United Nations and The World Bank, 2010) the following idea pre-
vails. In a manufacturing economy, an exogenous shock such as a natural disaster 
brings solutions that reactivate economic processes and improve existing condi-
tions. In particular, the focus is on the effects that the replacement of capital assets 
has on industrial production, benefiting from the possibility to purchase cutting-
edge technologies and techniques, as well as the multiplying effects of invest-
ments in the construction industry and other public works, which generate income 
from work and the demand for goods and services by families, businesses and the 
public administration. Other contributions (Geipel et al., 1990; DuPont and Noy, 
2015) study the medium- and long-term economic effects, indicating how the path 
followed is not necessarily that which the affected territory would have been able 
to follow if it had not suffered the natural disaster. To understand whether in the 
medium-term disasters can become an opportunity for the improvement of the af-
fected territories, we need to consider the local factors of development and the in-
terrelationships between territories, as well as the interrelationships between the 
different administrative levels involved in the reconstruction processes. The fact 
that the amount of resources for reconstruction is not the only variable at stake is 
also demonstrated by Barone & Mocetti (2014) in the essay comparing the growth 
paths of two Italian areas affected by earthquakes, Friuli in 1976 and Irpinia in 
1980: the latter received for decades considerable resources to cover the damage, 
but the area has not seen the transformation that one would expect considering the 
resources invested.  
Reconstruction and, in particular, the extent of public and private resources 
invested to cover the damage do not seem to be a sufficient condition for trigger-
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ing widespread opportunities for economic and social development. We need to 
explore the conditions that transform resources for reconstruction into economic 
and social innovations. With this objective, in this contribution we offer an inter-
pretation of the first results of the research project "Energie Sisma Emilia". In par-
ticular, we aim to highlight which stakeholders are active in the innovation pro-
cesses, underlining their role, relative position of power, their ability to implement 
strategies in a context of high uncertainty, occurring not only in the post-disaster 
emergency phase but also in the first years of reconstruction, given the resources 
available for reconstruction and the conditions to access them. The innovations we 
will analyse consider the artefacts (new public spaces, new construction technolo-
gies, new transport infrastructures, new administrative procedures) and the specif-
ic structures supporting the cascade of changes introduced by the many innova-
tions generated in the reconstruction phase (such as the managing of the commis-
sion structure or the IT procedures for managing reconstruction funds).  
Can we state that everything happening after a natural disaster is to be con-
sidered innovation? Referring to the case of the earthquake in Emilia, we will de-
scribe in which way reconstruction has triggered innovation processes in public 
actions (management of reconstruction, welfare and health will be the main ex-
amples), in business initiatives as well as in civil society. 
The reflections offered in this essay are based on the first interpretation of 
the results of the research work "Energie Sisma Emilia". Started in September 
2014 by a large research group from the University of Modena and Reggio Emi-
lia2, this project has two aims: by analysing the socio-economic effects of the 
earthquake at regional level, contributing to both building and sharing the 
knowledge required to foster the development of informed strategic decisions. 
The role of the university in the reconstruction process is in itself an element of 
innovation in the phase following a natural disaster: it is a key stakeholder, be-
 
2  The research project "Energie Sisma Emilia" (www.energie.unimore.it) – co-funded by the 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Modena, the Modena Health Board and the University of Mo-
dena and Reggio Emilia - follows on from the “Earthquake Laboratory” which was set up in 
June 2012 by a team formed with faculty of the Department of Economics in Modena and stu-
dents, together with researchers and professionals from outside academic research. The blog 
ricostruiremeglio (www.ricostruire meglio.wordpress.com) gathers the documentation produced 
in two years of activity, also thanks to the contribution of graduating students (Germana Ducato, 
Michela Passerini, Alfredo Pucci) and the internship conducted on the project by Riccardo Ri-
mondi. 
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cause it is potentially able to create new knowledge required to respond to the 
questions accompanying reconstruction. 
The earthquake in Emilia. The earthquake of May 2012 hugely marked the 
Emilia territory. With a population of around 550,000 inhabitants, the 58 affected 
municipalities constitute one of the country's most productive areas, producing 
almost 2% of the national GDP and offering a significant contribution to exports. 
The area has been the object of study for some time, due to the presence of im-
portant - industrial and agricultural – districts; for its governance and for a special 
balance between public and private action3. The material damage concerned main-
ly homes (around 31,000 were left uninhabitable), historical and cultural build-
ings, as well as buildings for health and social services and commercial and indus-
trial structures, the reconstruction of which is a necessary condition for ensuring 
the recovery of economic and social activities. The idea underlying the project 
"Energie Sisma Emilia" is that the earthquake produced a series of fractures: not 
only those in the physical structures, but also in the economic and social system, 
the recomposition of which is not easy to predict. Businesses, public administra-
tions, families seek solutions and responses to their own objectives, which are not 
necessarily the same as the ones they had prior to the earthquake, and which differ 
enormously according to the specific characteristics of the subjects (on different 
levels of power and decision making, and with different types of interactions in-
side and outside of the local system) and the time horizon on which they must/can 
be tackled.  
Earthquakes produce criticalities, but at the same time they offer important 
opportunities which depend on a set of factors: strategic decisions, public funds 
available, the phase of the cycle accompanying reconstruction, the key stakehold-
ers' ability for coordination, the ability to provide effective responses to the risks 
of infiltration of organised crime, the quality of the economic and social fabric 
where the event occurred.  
In this contribution. Three years after the earthquake, disaggregated data on 
the damage is still not available and an analysis of the reconstruction as a whole 
has only just begun. In this contribution we refer, in the first and second part re-
spectively, to a profile of the affected area and to the data available for character-
 
3 These are the main characteristics of the so-called “Emilia model” (Brusco, 1982), which has re-
cently returned to being a topic of discussion after the publication of some essays (cf. De Maria, 
2012; Russo, 2012; Montella, 2013; Mosconi, 2012; Panarari, 2015). 
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ising the effects of the earthquake in Emilia. In the third part we present the re-
sults emerging from the focus groups held in the first phase of the research involv-
ing twenty privileged witnesses in the fields investigated here: local authorities 
(referring to public management), manufacturing sector, credit sector. Eventually, 
a specific section of this work concerns the “MUDE Emergenza Terremoto” – 
“Earthquake Emergency MUDE”, the Single Digital Model for Building. We con-
clude this essay by proposing some thoughts on the innovation processes imple-
mented in the reconstruction phase.  
1. Profile of the area affected by the earthquake 
Population and employment 
The earthquake of May 2012 affected a very vast area, covering parts of 
Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and Lombardy. Huge damage was caused to the popula-
tion, buildings and infrastructures. Of the three regions affected, Emilia-Romagna 
suffered the greatest damage: the epicentres of the two main earthquakes (respec-
tively on 20 May 2012 and 29 May 2012) were both recorded on the border be-
tween the provinces of Modena and Ferrara. The 53 affected municipalities, in 
which the main damage was caused to housing, public buildings and production 
facilities4, also lie in Emilia-Romagna. These municipalities, covering a surface 
area of 2698 km2, are home to approximately 618,000 residents (source: 15th Gen-
eral Census of the Population and Housing – Istat, 2011). The affected area repre-
sents 12% of the total surface area of Emilia-Romagna and 14.2% of the total 
population of the region.  
In the period between the last two censuses 2001-2011, the population in the 
affected municipalities has increased due to the presence of foreign nationals in 
the area. There, the growth of population has been higher than that recorded at re-
gional level (+13.6%, compared to the regional average of +8.5%). In 2011, the 
foreign population resident in the municipalities affected by the earthquake was 
over 11.2% (one percent above the regional average). In the same period, the for-
 
4 The reference used is Ministerial Decree (D.M.) of 1 June 2012, "Suspension of terms for fulfil-
ment of tax obligations for the taxpayers affected by the earthquake of 20 May 2012". Consider-
ing the classification proposed in Order no. 29 of 28 August 2012 (indicating 58 municipalities) 
here we have excluded all the provincial capitals (Ferrara, Bologna, Modena and Reggio Emilia) 
and the municipality of Argenta. 
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eign population almost tripled: the phenomenon of family reunification, which 
began in the 1990s, has been consolidated, explaining the relatively higher in-
crease in the number of foreign women living in the territory. Today the popula-
tion is balanced in terms of gender, a signal of stability in the territory.  
In the whole affected area, there is a considerable increase in the population 
aged 0-9: this trend is attributable to the increase in foreign nationals in the area 
and the phenomenon of family reunification. In 2011, in the affected municipali-
ties, 10.2% of the population was aged under 10, but this figure increases to 
19.1% when considering only foreign people. The percentage of the (Italian) el-
derly population, aged over 70, increased to the same extent.  
In the decade 2001-2011 employment figures dropped and unemployment 
figures increased, in line with the regional economy trends for the same period.  
Agricultural sector 
In contrast to key seismic events occurring in the past few decades, the 
earthquake of 2012 affected a densely populated area in the heart of the Po Plain, 
a highly industrialised area with high employment rates. Also for this reason, it 
has been too often forgotten that the area affected by the earthquake is in fact also 
one of the country's major agricultural districts, which was also very damaged by 
the earthquakes of May 2012. The area affected by the 2012 earthquake is there-
fore also an agricultural area with strong implications on rural life: in 2010, the 53 
affected municipalities hosted 12,131 farms, covering a total of 187,100 hectares 
of utilised agricultural area (UAA), a total of over 2.8 million days worked, and 
1,162 breeding facilities5. At regional level, the incidence in terms of agricultural 
activities of these 53 municipalities is therefore particularly high (17.6% of the 
regional UAA and 16.5% of the total number of farms). The incidence of the 
number of breeding facilities out of the regional total is slightly lower (9.2%). 
It is worth reporting that these farms also have a considerable production 
diversification, with 87% of the UAA covering crops, as well as a specialisation 
in the cultivation of sugarbeet (33% of the regional UAA) and in forage plants, 
grapes (17.0% of the regional total) and fruit plants (17.0% regional, with a par-
ticularly significant production of pears). Animal husbandry is particularly wide-
 
5 The data referred to here and below refers to the business centre of the farm (Source: 6 th General 
Agricultural Census - Istat, 2010). 
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spread in the area hit by the earthquake (above all cows and pigs), and the average 
size of these farms is large.  
Alongside the high proportion of crop farming, fruit and grape farming are 
particularly important, contributing to characterising the variety of the farming 
landscape in this area. At the same time, the farming sector in these territories by 
and large covers quality productions, which are highly competitive on national 
and international markets, as can be gathered by the importance, in those munici-
palities affected by the earthquake, of the quality productions (Fanfani and Pieri, 
2013) and in particular PDO (Protected Designation of Origin) and PGI products 
(Protected Geographical Indication) are produced by 25.8% of the farms operating 
in the affected municipalities, covering 30.7% of their UAA and 45.4% of the 
days worked6. Referring to 2012 (the year of the earthquake), four of these pro-
ductions were included in the ten main Italian productions in terms of turnover: 
Grana Padano (1,790 million EUR), Parmigiano Reggiano (1,316 million EUR), 
Balsamic Vinegar of Modena (262 million EUR) and Mortadella Bologna (223 
million EUR) (Source Ismea, 2013). 
Secondary and tertiary sectors 
The General Censuses of Industry and Services held in 2001 and 2011 trace 
the conditions in the decade prior to the earthquake. From them, the extent of the 
effects of the crisis on the regional economic system clearly emerges: overall 
business employment increased only by 0.21%, while in the 53 affected munici-
palities there was a reduction of 6.3%. At regional level, the increase in the num-
ber of workers was driven by the tertiary sector7 (+12.5%), contrary to the general 
fall in the number of employees in the remaining macro-sectors: -36.3% in the 
primary sector8, -16% in the manufacturing sector, -4% in the construction sector. 
The affected municipalities recorded a drastic drop in the number of business 
units, attributable mainly to the manufacturing sector, one of the key sectors for 
the local economy.  
Within the area affected by the 2012 earthquake, there is a strong specialisa-
tion of the engineering sector, both in terms of business units and employees, 
 
6 Moreover, when considering a broader definition of the affected area (58 municipalities) these 
territories cover the production of at least 9 PDO and 15 PGI products. 
7 The reference is to all of sections G, H, I, J, K. L. M, N, P, Q, R and S of the NACE Classifica-
tion 2007. 
8 The reference is to all of sectors A and B, NACE Classification 2007. 
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while a drastic fall in both figures was recorded for the textiles sector. In all the 
territorial units analysed (region, area affected by the earthquake) the tertiarisation 
process is intensified, above all in terms of private services; however in the mu-
nicipalities of the affected area the tertiary sector has less weight both in terms of 
employees and business units. In 2011, in the 53 affected municipalities, the ter-
tiary sector represents 65.6% of the total number of business units and 43.5% of 
the total number of employees, compared to 74.7% and 59.9% respectively at re-
gional level. 
In the area affected by the earthquake, there is a larger percentage of people 
employed in the manufacturing sector: manufacturing activities9 continue to rep-
resent 19% of the total number of business units and 46.7% of the total number of 
employees in these business units. This figure is considerably higher than the av-
erage one, at regional level (respectively 29.6% and 10.7%). Engineering, textiles 
and clothing, but above all biomedical (included partly in the "mechanical" sector 
and partly in the "rubber" sector) prevail more in the area affected by the earth-
quake than in the regional average. In particular, in the affected area, these three 
activities count respectively for 3.9%, 14.5% and 2.6% out of the total number of 
employees in manufacturing activities. Also in this case, these figures are higher 
than the regional average. 
Although highly aggregated, these data provide a clear picture of the diffi-
culties faced by most of the affected municipalities. Due to economic crisis, many 
sectors (from manufacturing to trade) had already suffered greatly, above all in 
terms of reduction in the number of jobs. The research project "Energie Sisma 
Emilia" is currently investigating the conditions prior to the 2012 earthquake in 
some key economic sectors in the area affected by the earthquake. The objective 
is to understand the specific dynamics implemented by the various stakeholders of 
the production system, local authorities and regional administrations to tackle the 
damage caused by the earthquake. After a brief overview on damages (section 2), 
this work reports in section 3 on three areas that have already been explored in the 
research: local authorities, the manufacturing sector and the credit sector. In addi-
tion to these fields, we will also refer to the process of computerisation of the 
funding management procedure: an example of how innovations introduced in an 
 
9 The reference is to the total of all activities included in section C of the NACE Classification 
2007. 
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extraordinary regime of public action become part of an ordinary process, and can 
constitute factors for accelerating change. Section 4 highlights some critical issues 
and further research developments. 
2. The damage and resources (public and private)  
Housing 
Data disentangled by year of construction for buildings and houses, are not 
currently accessible in the statistics of the last census. Nevertheless, for this analy-
sis, key information would be that referring to the state of maintenance of single 
buildings (together with the relative building techniques). This is not available, 
although it would help us to understand to what extent the earthquake damaged 
those buildings, marked by poor maintenance. Out of the 15,803 homes damaged 
(affecting 25,427 residents) funds of approximately 1.061 billion EUR have been 
estimated for reconstruction works, against accepted costs of over 2.026 billion 
EUR. The funds widely cover the costs of reconstruction, and partially also seis-
mic improvement works and the enhancement of energy efficiency. The differ-
ences between the different territories will be analysed in detail as soon as the dis-
aggregated data is available by type of damage (according to the categories de-
fined by the Aedes - Agibilità e Danno nell’Emergenza Sismica - sheets) and by 
place of intervention. Here we intend to investigate an aggregated aspect which is 
of interest for analysing the effects of the earthquake: the leverage effect the funds 
for reconstruction are having in the affected area. For every EUR of public fund-
ing, there are only slightly less private resources (0.90 €). These interventions and 
resources will have a considerable effect on the transformation of the centres af-
fected, because they imply expectations of re-settlement by families, both for their 
primary residences and to recover part of the buildings destined for rental and the 
real estate market: these factors will contribute to the development of the affected 
area. 
Agriculture  
In July 2012, a first estimate of the damage caused by the earthquake was 
sent to the European Union by the Italian government: the 2012 earthquake 
caused over 13.2 billion EUR of damage, 5.7 billion EUR of which to productive 
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activities. Specifically, the damage to the agricultural and agri-industrial sector 
was estimated to approximately 2.3 billion EUR, the majority of which in the 
province of Modena: this damage refers not only to crops but also to agricultural 
machinery and equipment on the farms, as well as the stocks, which particularly 
affected the Parmigiano-Reggiano supply chain (Fanfani and Pieri, 2013). 
Disentangling damages by municipality and by single agri-food sectors is a 
complex operation. In addition to the need to gather precise information on the 
funding applications, a similar estimate also demands the underlying assumption 
that the producers involved can reconstruct the damaged capital completely and 
identically. In fact, there is a possibility (partly already ascertained over the past 
two years) that the damaged farms will wholly or partly reorganise their produc-
tion system, to make it more competitive and more sustainable in economic terms 
(Fanfani and Pieri, 2013). In the months immediately following the earthquake, 
many regulatory interventions were approved aiming to guarantee appropriate fi-
nancial support to the agricultural and agri-industrial activities damaged by the 
earthquake. In addition to the interventions destined specifically to agriculture, we 
also need to consider the funds supporting business research, income support for 
employees and independent workers (through "social shock absorber" funds), 
funds for the temporary relocation of businesses, trades, professions and services 
(through the variation of the ERDF OP for Emilia-Romagna 2007-2013). While 
not directly destined for farms, these interventions in any case had a significant 
impact on the reconstruction of the production fabric of the areas affected by the 
2012 earthquake.  
Production activities  
As far as production activities in the manufacturing sector and services are 
concerned, the estimates of the damages we can obtain from the "Sfinge" platform 
highlight funding applications for 1.828 billion EUR, mostly for buildings (75%), 
and in equal measure instrumental goods, stocks and relocation (12.5%). Dis-
aggregated data by municipality and production activity is not yet available, but 
three years after the earthquake the reconstruction is by and large complete. These 
investments have a distinguishing feature: often associated to incentives offered 
by regional laws for innovation, an exceptional modernisation of technologies has 
been made possible, with a more efficient reorganisation of the factory layouts 
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and the relocation of buildings in industrial complexes. Although disaggregated 
data is not available for business type and sector, from the interviews held until 
now this direction seems to have been undertaken systematically by the industrial 
businesses (we will return to this matter below in the paragraph on manufactur-
ing). The innovations have also concerned industrial buildings, allowing building 
types that today characterise the modern industrial areas of Germany to become 
part of the landscape in the area affected by the earthquake. 
Public Works, Cultural Heritage, School Buildings  
A total of 2027 interventions have been approved for public works, cultural 
heritage and school buildings, amounting to a total (gross of any co-funding) of 
1,654.9 million EUR, around three quarters with public funds. The main part of 
the interventions and resources concern the cultural heritage (1,056 million EUR), 
followed by public works (409 million EUR) and school buildings (177 million 
EUR), the remainder of the expenditure (around 13 million EUR) is for interven-
tions in public works and school buildings with minor damage (less than 50,000 
EUR) or mixed building units. The municipalities of the affected area in the prov-
ince of Modena are those where the damages are most concentrated, and maps 1-4 
show the territorial distribution of resources pro-capita destined for the recon-
struction of public works, cultural heritage and school buildings in the affected 
municipalities. While overall the distribution is quite concentrated in the most 
damaged municipalities, those closest to the epicentres of the earthquake, the dis-
tribution of school buildings is more concentrated in some of the municipalities: 
some municipalities such as Mirandola show a higher concentration of damage, 
but in other municipalities seismic improvement works were already underway in 
some schools, which greatly reduced the damage caused by the earthquake.  
3. Reconstruction and processes of innovation. Four thematic stud-
ies: Public management, manufacturing, credit and computerisa-
tion 
Within the project, some Focus Groups and semi-structured interviews have 
been held. From the interviews and Focus Groups held until now, we report on 
some data for analysing the reconstruction with reference to public management, 
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the manufacturing and credit sectors and the process of computerisation of build-
ing applications for reconstruction. 
Public Management: pre/post earthquake 
The Focus Group held in this field of research aimed to investigate the ef-
fects of the earthquake on local authorities, their internal organisation and in the 
services provided to citizens, businesses and the territory.  
We contacted municipalities, as public entities acting as coordinator, inter-
face or mediator of relations between the Public Sector (PS) and citizenship. For 
this reason we invited some civil servants working in the municipalities investi-
gated in the research10. Those officers have managerial roles (in some cases they 
were “dirigenti” )in some areas we identified as critical11 for our analysis, so we 
asked them  to report their own experiences in their specific area of competence. 
In effect the participants were asked to reflect on four key moments in the life of 
their administration: the pre-earthquake situation, the emergency immediately af-
ter the earthquake, the reconstruction phase and finally to frame some the pro-
spects for the future.  
From the first analysis of the materials emerging from Focus group it is pos-
sible to identify the following ideas and criticalities: 
Priorities have changed. The earthquake brought drastic changes to the pri-
orities of the municipalities, also concerning programming and planning. In this 
regard some examples were described concerning Mirandola. In particular, since 
2009 the municipality had launched a wide-scale project on territorial marketing, 
which was quickly set aside due to the earthquake emergency. Prior to the crisis, 
like many Italian municipalities, it suffered from difficulties in making invest-
ments due to the national Stability Pact. Despite this, the administration was im-
plementing an ambitious investment plan in schools and generally in the social 
 
10 Namely Cavezzo, Mirandola, Novi di Modena and San Felice sul Panaro,  
11 Specifically: budget, programming and control; social services and other services for different 
categories of citizens (including schools); public buildings (including schools); municipal and/or 
inter-municipal emergency plan managers; communication, information, dialogue with the local 
citizens and businesses, contact persons and coordinators of participatory projects. 
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sector; but also this plan was totally set aside following the earthquake. In addi-
tion also the new town plan (in Italian PSC - Piano di Sviluppo Comunale), which 
the municipality was implementing, was totally upturned following the earth-
quake. The reconstruction (and related town planning tools), were all transplanted 
onto this project.  
The earthquake also produced a deviation between the theory and practice 
of the Emergency Plans of the municipalities, and in many other public entities. 
Different social dynamics between the municipal administrations and the 
citizenship. While the participatory pathways implemented by administrations in 
"ordinary" situations are usually based on a well-defined project, clearly divided 
into sections and objectives, the example of the participatory pathways for recon-
struction implemented in Novi di Modena required great flexibility in managing 
the relationships between citizens and institutions, and between different catego-
ries of citizens (young people/the elderly, ex-representatives of institutions, stake-
holders …). Also as a consequence of different styles of government, not all mu-
nicipalities experienced the convinced presence of the citizens in the dialogue 
opened up by the local governments, as can be seen in the difference between the 
paths run in Novi, where new associations were also founded (leading to a frag-
mented framework that the administration tried to reunite) and in San Felice sul 
Panaro, where instead the traders played an active part. The municipalities also 
had to handle fractures linked to different visions of the city, for instance those 
whose homes had been damaged and those not12.  
Emergency/reconstruction: a useful distinction? The distinction is not as 
clear and easy to identify as we might imagine: the emergency phase is not over, 
while the reconstruction phase began straight after every tremor.  
The local authority budgets 
Constraints. The constraints imposed on the local authorities affected by the 
earthquake, in financial and fiscal terms, are still not (much) different to those of 
other local authorities nationally. From this point of view, apart from some dis-
 
12 The case of Mirandola emerged, where it was underlined how, after the first immediate phase of 
“damaged Mirandola”, many citizens who had not suffered damage were no longer "tuned into 
the reconstruction”: they continued to make cases that were important prior to the event, as if 
nothing had happened (in this case, the priority of the construction of a new multi-screen cinema 
in the municipality). 
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counts and benefits in the financial years immediately after the earthquake13, na-
tional legislation does not seem to have treated the municipalities affected by the 
earthquake much differently.  
The volume of work changed. What changed for the municipalities was the 
volume of incoming resources from national and regional governments . They 
were found having to manage far more resources, although also having to manage 
a much larger amount of provisions. In the offices, the dimension of the problems 
and the matters to deal with changed:  for example, municipalities had widely to 
deal with information for and attention from local citizens and the media, which 
beforehand was much more limited. This aspect also brings another problem of 
internal operations: the delicate relationship between the necessary care for de-
signing interventions (both in terms of investments and services), and the speed of 
the reconstruction interventions implemented. 
Innovations in budget management. The post-earthquake period drove offi-
cials to introduce operational changes to their activities. For example, some mu-
nicipalies decided to anticipate their own resources to fund reconstruction works 
in advance, knowing that such resources would be covered later by the regional 
and national funds destined for reconstruction. 
Innovations introduced to the PA with the earthquake.  
The debate in the focus groups highlighted various examples of innovations 
introduced into the public entities management as a result of the reconstruction af-
ter the earthquake. These innovations were more or less imposed, more or less ap-
preciated but they anyway seem to have marked a change compared to how things 
were done before. Here are some examples. 
“Creativity spiral” in the offices. The example given is that of Novi - but 
similar occurrences were reported in San Felice and other affected municipalities - 
highlighting how, with the birth of the COC ( Centro Operativo Comunale - Mu-
nicipal Operating Centre), very frequent meetings were organised during the 
emergency phase between politicians and municipal technicians, and between 
these and private technical figures. There was an intense period of dialogue and 
debate, marking an authentic example of teamwork. In many cases new ideas and 
ways of tackling the various situations were presented by the public officers them-
 
13 For example following the earthquake, the Stability Pact was temporarily lightened in some 
parts for the affected municipalities. 
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selves. Very creative and at times chaotic ideas, at times the result of performance 
anxiety; yet in any case elements of innovation introduced to internal operations. 
Part of these debates in fact still continues today. 
The “light enhancement” of the offices. In many cases during the focus 
groups it was reported that no great internal changes were introduced into the 
management of the offices, with particular reference to the municipality of Miran-
dola. What did change, as reported above, was the amount of work the offices had 
to deal with. In some cases, however, additional fixed-term staff were taken on in 
the municipalities to cover specific tasks, through the regional choices of the 
commission structure. These staff brought some changes to the internal organisa-
tion and the provision of certain services, becoming an integral part of the munic-
ipal administrative machine. 
Communication needs. In all sectors of PS activities present in the focus 
groups, an increase in the need for communication towards citizens was recorded, 
not only during the emergency phase. The need for more communications led to 
internal innovations. In Novi, for example, it was the opportunity to completely 
modernise the municipal website, and to re-introduce, due to needs of transparen-
cy and accountability, a "traditional" communication formula consisting in the po-
sitioning of panels in the square listing the funds granted to private individuals. 
Also the responsible of municipalities financial sector (in this case Mirandola) 
saw an increase in the quantity of information requested by citizens concerning 
the use of the funds gathered for reconstruction. The representatives of the Na-
tional Civil Protection Service had to make improvements and adopt innovations 
in their methods of communicating emergency situations (an example referred to 
an app for mobile phones being developed in this regard) after the widespread use 
of the social media in the period immediately after the earthquake.  
Works that were not thought possible. In the Focus group the example of the 
new school campus in Cavezzo was described. The campus is composed of new 
buildings which a municipality like Cavezzo would not have been able to achieve 
in such a limited time, considering the public finance constraints imposed on the 
local authorities. Another example, again in Cavezzo, in this regard, was the 
"Casa della Salute" project. The earthquake also offered the chance to start pub-
lic/private partnerships to (re)construct health care infrastructures for the commu-
nity. 
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Innovations introduced by local authority policies. For example the “Tavolo 
0-18” implemented by the municipality of Novi di Modena. This round table, part 
of the municipality's participatory efforts, offered the chance to think about the 
experiences of "forced cohabitation" the earthquake caused among the local popu-
lation, which led to new ideas and needs expressed by citizens, such as those 
linked to co-living and co-working. 
The relationship between different territorial levels 
The Associations of Municipalities (Unioni di Comuni). From the debate, a 
difference emerges in the role played by the two Associations of Municipalities 
involved (Novi di Modena belongs to the Unione Terre d'Argine while Cavezzo, 
Mirandola and San Felice are part of the Unione Comuni Area Nord ). In some 
cases the total absence of the Unione Comuni Area Nord in various areas of inter-
vention/recovery was reported, underlining the image of a "suspended" Unione 
Area Nord during the earthquake period. It was also remarked that this Unione in 
any case, at least in part, offered mutual support among the municipalities, serving 
above all in relations with regional and national governmental tiers. 
The case of the Unione Terre d'Argine was very different, since characteris-
tics and competences were different and Novi was the municipality most seriously 
damaged by the earthquake, so it was therefore supported in this regards by the 
other members of the association. 
The Emilia-Romagna Region. Some parties complained of the lack of re-
sponses from the regional government in a series of practical matters and internal 
management which continued to refer to regional provisions (for example in man-
aging “earthquake-staff”). Some innovations introduced by the regional institution 
in the  municipalities recovery and recostruction also emerged from the debate. In 
addition to the innovations in new public works, reference was also made to more 
"simple" matters, such as an innovation in the radios used by the Civil Protection 
forces, which completely changed some aspects of the working methods. 
Criticalities/Priorities/Opportunities for the future 
“Maintaining optimism”. In the municipalities hit by the earthquake, for ex-
ample Novi, it was underlined how, despite the clear objectives set by the munici-
pal government, there was a risk of "letting go". A “social bond”, as it was de-
fined by one of the participants in the focus group, created after the earthquake, 
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needs to be maintained. This is linked to the fact that some of the technical staff, 
who came from outside to support the municipality in the management of the 
post-earthquake period, will soon finish their jobs, and this is also an aspect that 
needs to be considered. 
The need for a general perspective. Mirandola represents one case where 
several times the communication manager reported on the need for a global vi-
sion. This requirement has implications for communication, but more generally 
refers to a plan the local government must have, with strategies and objectives 
which are currently partly missing, and which must be shared with the municipal 
technicians and the citizens. 
Different speeds and times of reconstruction. The Mirandola participants in 
the focus group described the difference in timing between private reconstruction 
and the public works. In the latter case, we are still in the design phase, some re-
sources are still missing, while in the former one the works are progressing more 
quickly. Linked to these aspects, comments were made on the historical centre of 
Mirandola. The participants from Mirandola referred how long it was taking to 
complete the reconstruction works in the historical center. A period of 7 to 10 
years was estimated to be needed for the area to be fully functional again. The 
hope and trust in the reconstruction works remain, but people are aware of the 
length of time it will take for them to be completed. The situation in Cavezzo ap-
pears quite different since it is estimated that, once the works on the sports facili-
ties have been completed, in 2016 the reconstruction works will be at a very ad-
vanced stage. 
Manufacturing sector 
The focus group was attended by (small and medium) businesses in the en-
gineering, biomedical and clothing sectors. Some businesses belonging to multi-
nationals also took part. The eight businesses - each with its own specific perspec-
tive, experience and area of competence - described how they managed the emer-
gency phase and the start of the reconstruction works, outlining their medium-
long term strategies. 
Before the earthquake 
The economic crisis. The economic crisis did not affect all the manufactur-
ing sectors represented in the FG in the same way, and many of the companies 
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recorded significant growth rates up to 2012. The sector most affected by the cri-
sis was the engineering sector (three of the companies present), with the exception 
of one company producing machinery for the agri-food sector. In the biomedical 
sector, on the other hand, the situation was very different for the subcontracting 
companies compared to the multinationals. More than drastic reductions in turno-
ver, the subcontracting company had to tackle problems linked to the greater un-
certainty in its relations with its main customer, which at the same time was start-
ing a process of internationalisation of some of the production phases, relocating 
other phases abroad. The representatives of the multinationals present at the focus 
group reported that, operating with their own brands on the world market, the 
companies had not felt the effects of the crisis. 
Identification of the pre-earthquake period. Identification of the pre-
earthquake period varies greatly from one sector to another, in some cases this 
phase began with the economic crisis, in others it began in the mid-1990s (tex-
tiles), following the generational turnover in company management, after the ac-
quisition by a foreign multinational, or when it was decided to diversify produc-
tion in order to focus on sectors which at that time were considered strategic. 
Competition and business strategies. Before the earthquake, the companies 
present at the focus group were affected by profoundly different forms of compe-
tition in terms of both nature and intensity. The strategies adopted were therefore 
equally different: in some cases the companies aimed to increase their technologi-
cal levels by investing in new machinery, to satisfy the requirements of customers 
and recover lost market shares; in other cases the strategy adopted was that of 
market repositioning, offering exclusively products with high added value, while 
other businesses chose to diversify production and broaden their sphere of compe-
tence. The increased level of competition appears to be a common feature of al-
most all the companies present (with the exception of the world leader in the fruit 
peeling machinery niche): in some cases this competition is outside the company, 
but in others it is also competition between different companies in the same mul-
tinational. 
Business transformations. In the pre-earthquake period, the majority of 
companies reported profound organisational changes and changes in the company 
management. In some cases, for small businesses, this was a generational turno-
ver, in others the change was due to the company being bought out by foreign 
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multinationals. Overall, all businesses present at the meeting recorded an in-
creased in turnover and in the number of employees in the period prior to the eco-
nomic crisis or for those affected in any case in the period prior to the earthquake. 
Some of these, just before the earthquake, had just introduced drastic modifica-
tions and innovations into their production processes, buildings and machine 
technologies. 
Emergency phase and post-earthquake reconstruction 
A collaborative response and immediate recovery. The earthquake did not 
cause any deaths or serious injuries in any of the companies present. The strong 
shock suffered by the various testimonials at the focus group emerged in their 
memories, thus bearing witness to the difficulties of a personal experience in 
which the fate of the business, the family and the community of employees be-
comes the key pillar of the reaction to the disaster. Not always with the required 
lucidity, but in all cases marked by a clear cooperative response from the workers, 
the management of the multinationals as well as between companies, to ensure 
that production could be resumed as quickly as possible and the sample collec-
tions, materials for delivery and stock and machinery could, where possible, be 
recovered without suffering additional damage. 
Temporary relocation. The damage of the earthquake brought logistic diffi-
culties in the cases in which the production had to be temporarily relocated, to 
find a site where the business activities could be resumed. Some businesses had 
trouble in correctly estimating the costs of relocation, coming up against poor 
flexibility in modifying the files uploaded onto the Sfinge application. 
Relations with customers. For some companies, the interruption of produc-
tion, even for a short period, also implied problems in the relations with custom-
ers, and in some cases the temporary or permanent loss of business. For other 
companies, such problems were not reported as the comparative advantage of 
their products made them irreplaceable, at least in the short term. 
Problems linked to common management and bureaucracy. In building 
complexes hosting several companies (condominiums) some friction was reported 
due to the fact that obtaining the final structural approval of a single company re-
quired that of the whole condominium; this problem was significant because the 
last instalment of reconstruction funding is granted only once the building has ob-
tained final structural approval. 
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In the emergency phase and the period of reconstruction after the earthquake 
the companies had, several times, reported their difficulties caused by the bureau-
cratic system to the local administrators and associations. In particular, fulfilling 
the obligations of warehouse accounting, in a period in which many of these were 
seriously damaged or inaccessible, or when the companies were relocating their 
production activities to and from their usual premises. Another problem reported 
was that some safety works had been started (or even completed) before the entry 
into force of the law which, for access to funding, required appointments given 
only to companies in the white list (art. 5-bis of Decree Law (D.L.) no. 74 of 6 
June 2012): this law was introduced precisely in the emergency and post-
earthquake reconstruction period, but many of the works had been necessary be-
fore the law came into force. 
Resources for reconstruction. In the case of insured businesses, decisions on 
interventions were greatly facilitated. In the case of multinational companies the 
large availability of resources greatly facilitated the ability to overcome the emer-
gency phase. The law granting soft loans for the payment of taxes and national in-
surance freed resources destined for further investments and to cope with the lack 
of economic resources deriving from the delay in trade payables. Moreover, gov-
erned by orders 91 and 158 of 2013, several companies applied for and received 
funds to eliminate structural weaknesses and improve the seismic condition of 
their premises. Some businesses also applied for funding from the European Re-
gional Development Fund, aiming to support investments and processes of tech-
nological and administrative change (capital grants up to a maximum of 45% of 
admissible expenditure and in any case no more than 200,000 EUR). 
Cooperation in the district. The companies, above all in the engineering sec-
tor, with a close network or productive relations, reported particularly cooperative 
phenomena in the post-earthquake period. Some businesses were assisted in the 
production of particular orders by companies with whom they had collaborative 
relations within the same business network. In one or more situations, the damage 
caused by the earthquake caused the companies to face the problem or relocating 
production. In some cases, they were hosted in other companies, or they them-
selves offered to host a company whose production facilities had suffered damage 
and could not continue to operate there. In both cases, although temporary, these 
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conditions led to thought on the organisational difficulties, but also on the poten-
tial of a similar work organisation.  
Workers, a business asset. All the companies present underlined several 
times that their employees represent an important asset for the company, even 
more so in an emergency situation like that of the post-earthquake period. In addi-
tion to their hard work, the desire to resume operations in the company they work 
for, the owners highlighted the highly specialised skills of their workers, skills 
which often the company creates in-house, given the clear gaps in the local educa-
tion and training system.  
Medium-long term prospects 
In analysing the medium-long term prospects, some comments emerged on 
the problems and opportunities of the post-earthquake phase. 
Criticalities. One critical aspect emerging from the discussion was the clear 
belief that the future (for the biomedical and engineering sectors) will be marked 
by a drastic increase in the level of competition, not only based on price but also 
on the quality of the products supplied. This aspect touches on the delicate issue 
of technological innovation, both of production processes and products, as well as 
training. Secondly, the companies performing outsourced services for the biomed-
ical sector underlined how the strategy is that of becoming "complete suppliers" 
above to provide services to large multinational firms. Finally, the development of 
production appears to be greatly conditioned by the very poor infrastructure in the 
area, which leads to serious economic damage altering the competitive perfor-
mance of businesses. Three areas were identified as extremely critical: (1) the 
chronic lack or unsuitability of the transport infrastructures (overload situation on 
the SS12 and the Cispadana route still not completed, despite being planned in the 
mid-80s); (2) lack of appropriate digital infrastructure (no fibre optics in the area); 
(3) problems of discontinuity in the mains electricity causing damage to the elec-
tronic equipment used in the biomedical sector. 
Opportunities. The economic and financial conditions, the available skills, 
but also - for the multinationals - the increased reputation enjoyed with the parent 
companies, have made it possible for all companies present at the FG to relaunch 
a growth process to recover the pre-earthquake situation: by expanding their pro-
duction facilities and warehouses, renewing technology, reorganising the machin-
ery and equipment layout, risk management analysis and process reorganisation, 
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but also new organisation of the management and ownership to cope with genera-
tional turnover (experimenting investment funds in the company ownership). An 
improvement in terms of production efficiency and greater competitive perfor-
mance which was obtained within a strategy of business expansion.  
According to some participants in the focus group, the earthquake brought a 
change in the way of thinking and acting, changes which occurred both in the 
company management and in the public institutions, and thanks to which these 
organisations now operate with a more medium-long term vision. It is as if the 
earthquake had relaunched the idea of project planning which the pre-crisis dy-
namics had lost sight of. From the experience gained after the earthquake some of 
the participants underlined how, in future, it is important not to neglect the im-
portance of the high levels of know-how in the district, and at national level the 
current favourable, or at least improving, situation in Italy must be exploited to 
the full. 
Matters to analyse 
The eight business representatives present at the focus group clearly de-
scribed the dynamics of the various manufacturing sectors before, during and after 
the earthquake. They also offered some ideas for future research. However, there 
were no (generally small) services companies, which play a fundamental role in 
the district, and which could have experienced very different phases and condi-
tions. Another aspect, to be considered in future phases of the research, is that in 
creating the focus group the companies selected very probably represent success 
stories. It is indeed probable that those companies which are still in difficulty 
three years after the earthquake (bankruptcy, closing, or still on the road to recov-
ery) were not willing to take part. From the analysis of the business demography 
by sector, class size and municipality, we will select a group of these companies 
to conduct further interviews. Another aspect to be considered is the analysis of 
the asset and financial structure of the companies in the area affected by the earth-
quake, and in particular to what extent the resumption of productive activity was 
supported by recourse to credit. Finally, a matter that still has to be tackled is how 
far the post-earthquake reconstruction can in itself constitute a deterrent for the 
birth of new businesses: for the next 4-8 years, the historical centres of many of 
affected municipalities will remain partly inaccessible (due to the slow and com-
plex recovery of the historic and monumental heritage and the building sties still 
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open), the structural fragility to be overcome could get worse, the local scale 
without any strong connections may not attract more dynamic businesses and nei-
ther the natural turnover for those family-run businesses which close due to the re-
tirement or withdrawal of their owners. A weak, or negative, demographic dynam-
ic could have serious consequences for the area as a whole, also because the more 
dynamic businesses would find themselves in a spiral of weaker external econo-
mies and fewer opportunities for sourcing local skills or attracting them from out-
side the area. 
Credit sector 
The main purpose of the credit Focus Group was to investigate the effects 
the earthquake had on the credit sector, and in particular the way in which the 
banks had to manage the emergency phase initially and subsequently the granting 
of funds for reconstruction. 
Emergency phase 
Resuming services. For all banks with branches in the affected area, the 
earthquake that caused most damage was that of 29 May. In particular the branch-
es of groups with headquarters in the historical centres of the municipalities in the 
area hit by the earthquake were affected. To tackle this emergency and ensure the 
continuity of the credit services, branches were set up in containers and travelling 
camper vans. From the various testimonials it emerged that in the first few months 
after the earthquake the main service needed was that of the provision of cash: at 
that time, nobody was able to think about reconstruction or possible funding. 
Management of human resources. The employees of the branches that were 
temporarily closed were transferred to outlying branches. In the case of San Felice 
1893 Banca Popolare, the transfer of the main headquarters to Modena involved 
the payment of incentives to compensate for the difficulties caused by extra travel. 
Some banks provided a free psychological support service, and paid leave to em-
ployees to help them overcome the emergency phase more tranquilly. 
Business Continuity Plan. From the discussion among the participants, it 
emerged that after the earthquake the business continuity plans were strengthened. 
The provisions introduced to reduce operating risk aimed above all to improve 
computer security, thus reducing the vulnerability of banks in technical and organ-
isational terms. 
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The reconstruction phase 
Credit institutes played a key role in two fields during reconstruction: rela-
tions with the inland revenue and funding for reconstruction. 
Relations with the inland revenue. On 5 November 2012, ABI and Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) signed the first agreement to postpone tax payments, na-
tional insurance and social security contributions due to the inland revenue by 
business owners. The CDP made available a maximum limit of 6 billion EUR to 
the banks, postponing the obligations of the period May/November 2012 and the 
amounts due from 1 December 2012 until 30 June 2013. The participants in the 
focus group stated that 10 days after the publication of the moratorium they re-
ceived over 1,000 operations, performed in the span of a week thanks to the estab-
lishment of task forces. The postponement of the repayment terms, currently set 
for 30 June 2016 may however imply a series of risks. Many companies have ac-
cumulated debts and will have difficulty in repaying the amounts on the due date, 
the effects of which will fall on the credit institutions but also on the companies 
themselves, who will see their funding revoked.  
Funding for reconstruction. In the first two months following the earthquake 
the banks had the perception that the Region could have trouble in funding the re-
construction, so every bank started to formulate forms of soft loans. In July 2012 
the first instalment of funding worth 2.5 billion EUR was issued, and in December 
of the same year the second, worth 6 billion, for repairs and reconstruction works 
on property damaged by the earthquake. The banks participating in the operation 
were originally all those with the technical capacity to manage the payment of 
funds, and presented a price list of costs for managing the applications. Although 
in this phase the role of the banks appeared to be merely executive, a series of 
criticalities emerged in particular in managing to make the customers understand 
the nature of the operations (often bottlenecks are created in the administration of 
procedures due to the incorrect presentation of the documentation by private cus-
tomers and consequently a block in transferring the funds from the bank to the 
business).  
Medium-long term prospects 
From the discussion among the participants it emerged that the current 
phase is considered a period of transition for many sectors. Some are in difficulty, 
while for others it is a growth phase. In the biomedical sector, the earthquake gen-
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erated opportunities for increased efficiency which would not have been possible 
otherwise. The multinationals recognised the availability of skilled staff and tech-
nological innovations developed in the sector, continuing to support the invest-
ment process. SMEs with high innovation and strong commercial internationalisa-
tion have been able to reap the opportunities of the earthquake to renew their 
business. The sectors which on the other hand have accelerated a process of de-
cline which was already in progress prior to the earthquake are trade, real estate, 
the construction sector and textiles SMEs. In particular, in the real estate sector, 
the participants acknowledged that the earthquake will be help to raise prices, as 
the value of many unsold buildings will be lower than that of buildings rebuilt af-
ter the earthquake. 
Topics for further study 
One aspect to be considered in the coming phases is the financial architec-
ture which has supported the reconstruction process and in particular the relation-
ship between the CDP and the credit institutions. A further element for analysis is 
the sequence of legislative acts issued for the moratorium on taxes and the "Earth-
quake 2012 Reconstruction Ceiling”. We will also investigate the role of insur-
ance undertakings in the reconstruction phase. 
Computerisation of building permit applications for reconstruction  
With the “MUDE Emergenza Terremoto” project, the Emilia-Romagna Re-
gion placed leverage on the processes which had already been started prior to the 
earthquake with a relaunch which in a very short time aimed to manage the ex-
traordinary processes of granting loans for building reconstruction. A path which 
deserves attention for the implications it may have in accelerating change also in 
the management of ordinary procedures. 
Acceleration of processes started but not yet implemented 
The 2012 earthquake represents the first case in Italy in which the manage-
ment of applications, allocation and payment of grants for repairing homes dam-
aged by a natural disaster have been fully computerised. The MUDE (Modello 
Unico Digitale per l'Edilizia - Single Digital Form for Building) is the computer 
platform used in Emilia for this purpose. This is an example of the innovations 
brought to the public administrations by information and communication technol-
ogies, but the context is not that of normal planning, but rather that of the post-
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earthquake emergency. There are three key points of this innovation: the accelera-
tion of processes of creating a tailored “Earthquake Emergency MUDE” product 
(to manage grant files); the creation of a network of competences required to sup-
port its effective implementation; the multitude of stakeholders involved in the 
procedure and their roles. A fourth need must be considered: the implications that 
this process may have in the generalisation of the region-wide ordinary manage-
ment of building applications, as well as the management of funding for the post-
earthquake reconstruction.  
The MUDE before the earthquake 
Italian Law no. 80/2006 introduces the "Modello Unico Digitale per l'Edi-
lizia" (Single Digital Form for Building, hereinafter MUDE) as a tool for simpli-
fying land registry and building administrative procedures. Its purpose is the com-
puterisation of permission granting for private buildings in the municipalities and 
the correlation with the relative land registry requirements (the real-estate - taxa-
tion process managed by the Local Agency). Since 2006 the specification and op-
erations of this innovation have been appointed to various national projects, but 
there has been no clear definition by the national legislator on the operational in-
struments for implementing the MUDE throughout the national territory, nor a 
single evaluation of the ability of the system to provide instruments and skills for 
managing it. The agreement between the Umbria, Piedmont and Emilia-Romagna 
regions marks a first step in the creation of a platform for digitalising this process. 
The Piedmont Region developed and used the “MUDE Piemonte” platform on a 
regional scale, operational since 2011, involving many other Piedmont local au-
thorities through cooperation agreements and based operationally on the ICT in-
frastructures developed by the Consorzio Sistemi Informatici (CSI) in Piedmont. 
Even before the earthquake, the Emilia-Romagna region had begun experimenting 
on MUDE, aiming to transit towards Sieder (Sistema informativo per l'edilizia del 
territorio regionale - Regional Territorial Computer System for Construction). 
This project aimed to create a regional computer system allowing all stakeholders 
in the building process, in any part of the region, to interface with the municipality 
through a computerised procedure. The aim is to allow citizens to transmit all 
building applications and procedures and standardise the forms used. Experiments 
had begun in the municipalities of Modena and Bologna: each highly innovative 
experiment focused on specific aspects of the process, for example the develop-
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ment of certain stages, such as the pre-registration of a building or the collection 
of documentary materials for certain procedures.  
From experimentation to uniform implementation in the post-earthquake phase 
Immediately after the earthquake, the first orders on private building recon-
struction, issued by the Commissioner Delegate, clarify that the funding applica-
tion can only be drafted using the specific computerised procedure set up by the 
commission structure. From 2012, therefore, the “Earthquake Emergency MUDE” 
was adopted as the sole instrument for the exclusively computerised design of the 
authorisation proceedings for allocating funding for the reconstruction of build-
ings14.  
An exogenous shock such as an earthquake, therefore, transforms what was 
previously a project being experimented into ordinary practice in the administra-
tions affected by the earthquake.  
Processes of innovation in the management of Public Administration activi-
ties require the synergy of a revision of organisational processes, the introduction 
of new technological systems and the training of the staff involved in the new 
processes. The case of the “Earthquake Emergency MUDE” demanded quick ac-
tion, and therefore this synergy was particularly complex. First of all, in techno-
logical terms, the MUDE experiments in progress in the region, while highly in-
novative, were not able to support the necessary integrations to tackle the man-
agement procedures for the funding applications for building reconstruction. The 
cooperation which had already begun between the Emilia-Romagna and Piedmont 
regions ensured the very quick implementation of a platform which had already 
been tried and tested on a broad scale, the one developed by CSI Piedmont. Spe-
cific procedures were developed on this platform to adapt it to the needs of man-
aging post-earthquake funding. The revision of internal processes in the organisa-
tions in order to implement this innovation, on the other hand, required firstly the 
identification of the bodies which were to be in charge of these new processes. 
And this is another peculiarity of the “Earthquake Emergency MUDE”, because 
consideration had to be made both for the need to standardise the procedure across 
 
14 Parts of production and trade premises can also be included in the MUDE system, if they are 
part of the same structural unit as housing units for which funding is applied for. The same ap-
plies for brick-built farm buildings (e.g. stables built according to older methods, often annexed 
to the farmhouses). The majority of the production activity reconstruction is however managed 
through another procedure called Sfinge. 
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the territory and the awareness that the absolute stakeholders of the procedure had 
to be the municipalities, delegated to manage building permits. Finally, in terms 
of training and awareness raising among the staff involved, it is worth remember-
ing that many figures revolve around the MUDE procedure: the application filer15, 
the designer who manages it, the municipal technicians, the credit institutions 
paying out the funding, the works contractor (which can be only one company). 
There are also other "passive" players in the MUDE: the Inland Revenue, which 
assesses the impact of tax credits granted by the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti on the 
funding, or the Procure (district attorneys) who monitor the reconstruction and in-
vestigate any suspect cases. To manage this complexity, the general approach 
adopted by the Commissioner was to involve the system of local autonomies 
through governance practices, first of all organised by the institutional Commit-
tees composed of the presidents of the provinces and the mayors of the municipal-
ities involved: this involvement allowed decisions to be taken, working together in 
the implementation of policies in the post-earthquake phase (and therefore also for 
the part of reconstruction managed via MUDE). Alongside the institutional com-
mittees, training and discussion sessions were organised for the staff who had to 
concretely work on the infrastructure: the municipal technicians, staff trained spe-
cifically to manage the needs of every municipality, professionals (and their asso-
ciations). The objective was to tackle the many criticalities which emerged during 
the process, effectively integrating the platform that was being engineered. 
The Earthquake Emergency MUDE in deed: procedural aspects 
It is clear that the funding application process with widespread responsibili-
ties held by a range of stakeholders is very complex. Basically, the mechanism 
works like a normal building permit management procedure, in which the design-
er, on behalf of the recipient, completes the application with the data concerning 
the building (including the sworn technical report certifying the cause-effect of 
the earthquake/damage) and submits it to the municipality. 
The municipalities are one of the key stakeholders. They have the main task 
of implementing the inputs to manage the MUDE procedure. First of all, this 
meant implementing the computer infrastructure: it meant training staff for the 
 
15 The filer of the funding application does not always coincide with the owner of the building to 
be reconstructed. In the case of condominiums, for example, the application must be filed by a 
single person, representing the interests of all owners. 
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purpose, in many cases temporary staff hired by the municipalities according to 
the provisions of the regional orders. The municipalities manage the back office 
phase of the MUDE (protocolling the application submitted by the designer, ap-
plication investigation) up to the actual granting of the funding order, i.e. the out-
put of the internal process. With the funding order, the contribution authorised to 
the private party is defined and can be sent to the credit institutions for payment16. 
The administrative procedure incorporated in MUDE is complex due to the quan-
tity and quality of the information the designer has to include in the application, 
the checks to be carried out by the municipalities and the constant updating of the 
regulations laid down in the commission orders. In some cases, this led to delays 
in the investigation phase, with consequent effects on the reconstruction times. In 
many circumstances, moreover, there was no full integration between the munici-
pal technical offices (with their own management systems) and the new computer-
ised procedure. This led to some processes and activities being performed in par-
allel, making the system less effective. 
On the other side of the MUDE structure are designers, fundamental figures 
as, on the basis of the proxy mechanism, they have the responsibility for the file 
and act on behalf of the applicant.  
The relationship between the stakeholders of this procedure offers much 
food for thought on the innovation processes induced by the responses for manag-
ing post-earthquake reconstruction. First of all, it is worth investigating the rela-
tionship of trust between the applicant and the designer. Application filers are left 
freedom of choice in selecting the professional designer who manages the file; 
several times it has been underlined how this could have implications in terms of 
non-uniformity of the living environment following reconstruction, compared to a 
context in which such relationship was made to be based less on trust (such as, for 
example, the alternative of creating a pool of professionals in the regional com-
mission structure to supervise all reconstruction works). Again, the lack of ceiling 
to the number of files managed by each designer has led to a concentration of 
many files in the hands of very few designers, which could potentially delay the 
reconstruction. Also in this case, many stakeholders in the MUDE process, from 
 
16 Payments which, unless the application filer has already paid out money for reconstruction in 
advance, do not go directly to him but rather to the companies working on the reconstruction 
(professionals, contractors, etc.); in most cases, the payments are made according to works pro-
gress.  
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different viewpoints, underline the fact that it would have been more appropriate 
to establish cooperation among several design firms to create the critical assembly 
required to manage the technical and organisational innovations in building (from 
design to construction) which could lead from the reconstruction. Others highlight 
how the salary for the designers, set by law, is not considered sufficient to make it 
profitable for larger sized firms or those outside the area to enter the reconstruc-
tion market.  
It is also worth noting how the technical construction of the “Earthquake 
Emergency MUDE” platform introduced many details with a view to improving 
the efficiency of those managing building permit applications. One example is: 
the automated spreadsheets made available by the municipalities to manage the 
applications, which can become a tool for analysing the productivity of the pro-
cesses implemented by each municipality; the digital forms collecting the specific 
selection of information to use to request the Single Booking Code (CUP), which 
is essential for applications for public funding, avoiding the manual entry of in-
formation in the CUP platform that has already been digitalised in the Earthquake 
Emergency MUDE platform; the computerised documentation of the mandatory 
traceability of all bank transfers between the credit institutions, designers and con-
tractors, exploiting the potential introduced by the SEPA (Single Euro Payments 
Area), the inter-bank payment circuit, and connecting these to the rest of the file 
data using specific reconciliation strings.  
From the “Earthquake Emergency MUDE” to the "Regional Territorial Comput-
er System for Construction” 
From the situation described in the previous paragraph, we can see that the 
primary output of the MUDE procedure, i.e. the granting of funding, is only one 
first aspect of the complexity an innovation like this brings for all stakeholders in-
volved. All the implications of the “Earthquake Emergency MUDE” structure 
must be monitored and studied with a view to assessing how the outcome of the 
whole process will be achieved, which is at the end of the day the ultimate objec-
tive: to ensure that the people can return to their homes damaged by the earth-
quake as soon as possible. 
The adoption of the “Earthquake Emergency MUDE” is not a self-contained 
operation: it is part of a broader design of a series of innovations in the public ad-
ministration. Thanks to the computerised procedure, much data will be available 
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on the post-earthquake phase. This aspect will allow us to review the reconstruc-
tion itself in snap-shots of the various phases; and to analyse and monitor the re-
construction to make visible the policy choices. 
4. Conclusions  
Three years after the earthquake, the time horizon on which we observe the 
post-earthquake reconstruction processes is still too short to be able to offer a 
clear picture of the effective potential of the changes implemented in response to 
the shock caused by the earthquake. However, from the elements analysed so far, 
the "Energie Sisma Emilia" project allows us to offer an overview of the dynamics 
which can be effective in consolidating (or indeed impeding) these changes in 
cascades of innovation. 
The reconstruction processes are analysed in three major areas. The first one 
concerns the stakeholders involved (workers, families, businesses, non-profit or-
ganisations, public administration, local authorities) in their specific positions and 
roles: not “the workers”, but the specificities emerging from the living and work-
ing conditions of people; not “businesses”, but the variegated multitude of experi-
ences, competences, technologies, strategies, financial resources, aptitude for 
change and risk; not the “large, medium or small municipalities; the more or less 
manufacturing ones”, but the competences, organisational structures supporting 
the actions taken to build the new local social fabric or create, for example, the 
new organisation of the public administration developed as the provinces are abol-
ished. The second one concerns the artefacts contributing to focusing the objec-
tives of various stakeholders in the reconstruction process, such as: schools, digi-
talisation of building permit applications, health services, but also the communica-
tion of the outcomes of the reconstruction. The third one is the analysis of the in-
teractions between different stakeholders.  
Finally, we need to consider how the time horizon of the reconstruction pro-
cesses affects the interactions between stakeholders and artefacts. The reconstruc-
tion has established many different processes: material transformation (for exam-
ple, the building technical specifications), agreement with the local citizens on the 
direction the local authority's choices will take, creating specific structures to sup-
port transformation processes (for example, the planning tools to create public 
space). The analysis of the transformation processes concerns the social sphere, 
  33 
the economy and the public administration in the territories affected by the earth-
quake, as well as the regional administration, which acts as the reference for coor-
dinating local actions. We need therefore on one hand to understand if the recon-
struction can keep the step with the expectations of "reconstructing better", and on 
the other hand, how far the area affected by the earthquake - ultimately a marginal 
area of the region, far from decision making centres of the regional politics and 
government - can constitute a laboratory for experimenting transformations on a 
broader scale of the regional territory. In this sense, the analysis of the reconstruc-
tion today and the monitoring of what will happen in the coming years become es-
sential tools for implementing informed public policies, able to steer the territory 
affected by the earthquake towards more sustainable, innovative and inclusive 
economic and social development paths than would have happened if they had not 
been hit by the earthquake. It is with this interpretation that the "Energie Sisma 
Emilia" project reads the resilience of the social, political and institutional system 
of the territory hit by the earthquake. 
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